We revisit the dynamic oligopoly game with capacity accumulation à la Solow-Swan originally investigated by Reynolds (1987 Reynolds ( , 1991 in order to propose a new and simpler method for characterising in a fully analytical way the feedback solution of the game. Then, we contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. The striking difference between the two equilibria is to be found in their respective limit properties: while the open-loop equilibrium sustains an infinitely large number of firms surviving with zero profits in the long run, the presence of feedback effects intensifying strategic interaction implies that (i) the number of firms that may survive under feedback information is finite, and (ii) smaller than the socially optimal one.
INTRODUCTION
The Solow-Swan model of economic growth with capital accumulation (Solow, 1956 , Swan, 1956 is, together with its general equilibrium counterpart (Ramsey, 1928) , a cornerstone of modern macroeconomics. Conversely, its corresponding interpretation as a strategic model in the field of industrial organization has received comparatively scanty attention. To the best of our knowledge, the only contributions to oligopoly theory examining setups where investment is reversible but capacity is subject to adjustment costs 2 -as in the Solow-Swan model -are those of Fershtman and Muller (1984) and Reynolds (1987 Reynolds ( , 1991 , while Lambertini (1998, 2008) characterise the open-loop and (degenerate) feedback equilibria of an oligopoly à la Ramsey, where capacity accumulation is not explicitly costly but entails consumption (or sales) postponement. 3 1 The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies 2 A similar approach, whereby adjusting output levels is costly, is adopted by Driskill and McCafferty (1989) . The analysis of conjectural variations in a feedback oligopoly game with adjustment costs is in Dockner (1992) . For a thorough discussion of oligopoly applications of differential game theory, see Jun and Vives (2004) . 3 Applications of these models to trade theory and policy can be found in Lambertini (2006, 2007) .
Here we propose a simpler (and more general) approach to the solution of the linear-quadratic differential oligopoly game à la Solow-Swan originally investigated by Reynolds (1987 Reynolds ( , 1991 . His solution method involves the use of trigonometric functions as well as some numerical calculations. This admittedly entails that the applicability of the model is hindered. Our method, instead, relies on some reasonable symmetry assumptions that yield a fully analytical solution of the Bellman equation of the representative firm.
This feedback solution is contrasted with the open-loop equilibrium of the same game, in order to investigate the consequences of increasing the amount of information used by firms on the limit properties of the model. This exercise allows us to single out a few interesting results. In particular, the maximum number of firms that can survive at the long run equilibrium is infinitely large under openloop information while it is finite under feedback information. This fact is due to the higher degree of strategic interaction characterising the feedback game as compared to the open-loop one. The larger investment levels (i.e., higher costs) generated by the incentive to preempt rivals when feedback effects are operating, poses an upper bound to the population of firms. This, intuitively, implies that the long run industry structure at the feedback equilibrium is too concentrated as compared to what would be socially efficient.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid out in section 2. Section 3 illustrates the open-loop Nash solution. The feedback equilibrium is investigated in section 4. Concluding remarks and suggestions for applications are in section 5.
THE BASIC SETUP
We examine a differential oligopoly game in continuous time t ∈ [0, ∞) , in which N firms invest à la Solow-Swan to create productive capacity. Firm i's state and control variables are the capacity endowment k i (t) and the instantaneous investment I i (t) , respectively, and the kinematic equation of capacity is
(1) where δ ≥ 0 is the constant decay rate of capacity, symmetric across all firms.
Firms operate at full capacity at every instant, and sell a homogeneous good. The inverse market demand function is linear:
(2)
Investment involves a convex instantaneous cost Γ i (t) = qI i (t) + cI 2 i (t) /2. The marginal cost associated with the production of the consumption good is constant, symmetric across firms and normalised to zero for the sake of simplicity. Hence, the instantaneous profit function of firm i is:
and firm i chooses I i (t) ≥ 0 so as to maximise the discounted profit flow
s.t. the set of dynamic constraints (1) and initial conditions k i (0) = k i0 > 0. The discount rate ρ ≥ 0 is constant and common to all firms.
In the original Reynolds' model the state space is a compact set in the positive quadrant in which the net revenue is increasing, whereas each control variable is real. We intend to modify such hypotheses and replace them with the requirement that both the state space and the control space coincide with the positive orthant R N + .
THE OPEN-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Under open-loop information, firm i has to choose its instantaneous investment I i (t) so as to maximise the Hamiltonian function:
where λ ij (t) is the costate variable associated with the state k j (t) , under the set of dynamic constraints given by the state equations (1) and initial conditions k i (0) = k i0 > 0.
The necessary conditions are:
where (8) can be disregarded as the rivals' capacities do not enter (6-7).
Using (6-7) and imposing the symmetry conditions
for all i, j, we obtain the following control dynamics: 4
whereby the steady state equilibrium point of the openloop Nash game is
The following can be shown to hold: 5 Proposition 1. The steady state (k OL , I OL ) is a saddle point equilibrium.
The resulting steady state profits are
The equilibrium level of social welfare is:
where CS OL = (N k OL ) 2 /2 is the equilibrium level of consumer surplus, and
It is then easily shown that the following result holds: 6
The steady state social welfare level is monotonically increasing in N.
That is, the profit incentive measured by steady state open-loop profits attracts infinitely many firms to the market, and this is also socially efficient. Accordingly, the limit properties of the open-loop solution fully fit the acquired wisdom we are accustomed with from, say, the standard static oligopoly literature (see, e.g., Novshek, 1980) . We are about to see that this is not the case when feedback effects are duly accounted for. 4 In the remainder of the paper we omit the explicit indication of the time argument for the sake of brevity. 5 The proof is omitted as it replicates an analogous proof carried out by Reynolds (1987) in the duopoly case. 6 Observe that, due to the functional form of Γ, the numerator of (12) increases in N more rapidly than the denominator. 
where V i (k) is firm i's optimal value function that depends on the vector of states k = (k 1 , k 2 , ...k N ) . We guess the following form for V i (k):
where we attach no weight to any quadratic term k 2 j , j = i, as these do not appear in the instantaneous payoff and in the set of state equations. Moreover, the choice of coefficients reflects the a priori symmetry characterising the game. That is: (i) the weights that i attaches to its own quadratic and linear terms, α and γ, are the same for all i; (ii) the weights that i attaches to the mixed terms and the remaining linear ones involving rivals' capacities, β and ε, are the same for all i; (iii) the free term φ is symmetric across firms.
The solution procedure requires taking the set of first order conditions 7 on the r.h.s. of (14), substituting their solutions into (14) and simplifying the latter in order to obtain a second-degree polynomial in the states.
The first order condition for firm i is:
yielding:
Now we plug all of the expressions I * i into (14), and then impose symmetry across players w.r.t. states, i.e., we set k i = k j = k for all i, j. This amounts to saying that we focus our attention to a symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium. This yields the following:
which can be appropriately rewritten as follows:
This gives rise to the following system of three equations:
Second-order conditions for concavity are satisfied by construction, in view of the linear-quadratic form of the problem at hand.
with five unknown parameters (α, β, γ, ε, φ) . Hence, we need two additional equations to be constructed using economically plausible conditions that a priori the model must necessarily satisfy. The first obtains exploiting the idea that, if N = 1, the model ceases to be a game and becomes an optimal control model with a single agent (a monopolist). Accordingly, the optimal control and state yielded by the feedback solution must coincide with those produced by open-loop information. The second comes from the opposite direction, as the limit of optimal controls and states for N tending to infinity must be the same (in particular, zero) under both feedback and open-loop information. In view of these additional constraints, the system (20) becomes determined.
To begin with,
Then, we solve the equation generated by the linear term w.r.t. γ, obtaining:
Now we are left with the first equation in (20), that can be solved w.r.t. α:
Stability requires us to pick the negative root in (23).
At this point, we proceed to construct a condition based on the monopoly solution. The open-loop equilibrium capacity under monopoly is: 8
Imposing stationarity on (1) and solving it w.r.t. k, we obtain an expression k (β, ε) that must be equal to k M in N = 1. To this purpose, we solve k (β, ε) − k M = 0 obtaining ε (β) , with
Finally, we are left with the issue of determining β. This problem can be tackled by solving: lim N→∞ k (β, ε (β)) = 0 ⇒ (28)
8 See above, expression (10).
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Optimal parameters can now be plugged recursively into one another as well as in the expression of k (β, ε) to obtain the feedback equilibrium capacity level k F :
The corresponding feedback equilibrium investment is obviously I F = δk F . Also in this case, it can be easily shown that the pair (k F , I F ) identifies a saddle point equilibrium (the details of the proof are omitted for the sake of brevity).
Using (10) and (30), one can immediately check that the following intuitive properties hold:
that is, (i) firms become atomistic in the limit as their population becomes infinitely large, under both open-loop and feedback rules, and (ii) the monopoly solution is the same in both cases.
Then, we can adopt plausible values for exogenous parameters, e.g., A = 10, q = c = 1, ρ = 1/20 and δ = 2ρ to plot relevant magnitudes and assess their behaviour as market structure (measured by the number of firms N) varies. This exercise yields Figures 1,2 and 3. That is, for all finite number of firms N ≥ 2, k F > k OL and consequently I F > I OL . Consequently, π OL > π F holds as well. However, the incentive to preempt (or equivalently, the intensified degree of strategic interaction) created by the presence of feedback information causes the feedback equilibrium profits to drop to zero in correspondence of a finite number of firms. In particular, with the numerical values we are using in this example, this happens at N = 48.79. This, in view of the obvious integer constraint concerning N, implies that the maximum number of firms that may survive in the long run under feedback information is N = 48. Checking the sign of ∂SW F /∂N at N = 48, we see that social welfare is increasing. This result is the balance of the two opposite effects generated by any increase in the population of firms: the first is the negative Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 -September 2, 2011 externality that each additional firm entering the industry exerts on the population of incumbents (and therefore, ultimately, on the performance of industry profits); the second is the increase in consumer surplus resulting from the price reduction and output expansion that goes along with the entry process itself. As in any setting replicating the essence of the Cournot model, 9 the second effect outweighs the first and consequently the entry process is welfare improving. This translates into:
Proposition 3. At the feedback equilibrium, the population of firms surviving with zero profits is smaller than socially optimal. This is possibly the most striking difference between the industry performance observed at the (subgame perfect) feedback equilibrium and that emerging from the openloop game, and it must be entirely traced back to the excess investment in capacity driven by feedback effects intensifying strategic interaction among firms.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Here we have proposed a fully analytical and relatively compact solution to the feedback problem faced by a population of oligopolistic firms involved in a differential game with costly capacity adjustment à la Solow-Swan. We have shown that the limit properties of the feedback equilibrium drastically differ from those characterising the open-loop one, in particular because the maximum number of firms that may survive in the long run is infinitely high under open-loop information while it is finite under feedback information.
Applications of our solution method for the feedback equilibrium can of course be envisaged in several directions, such as the analysis of horizontal mergers, intraindustry trade and foreign direct investments, environmental issues related to production and/or consumption, and so on. Additionally, it would be desirable to extend this solution method to accomodate the realistic perspective in which firms are, to some degree, asymmetric, for instance in terms of production and investment costs. These tasks are left for future research.
